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Abstract
This paper examines how the opportunity costs of the leaders of a national protest movement, and the
intrinsic hawkishness or pacism of the occupier, a¤ect the nature of the movement against occupation.
A two-stage game is modeled, in which a protest leader and an external occupier ght over the control
of the population of an occupied region. The protest leader can actively convert the populace to protest.
On the other hand, the occupier chooses how much to punish the protest leader and other protestors
for their actions. The ndings of this paper indicate that under certain circumstances leaders who
have a greater opportunity cost of leading protests may be more active, compared to leaders with lower
opportunity costs. Further, the former may be able to lead a movement with more mass support. This
paper also characterizes equilibria, among others, where a more hawkish occupier can actually de-escalate
the conict with the protestors. The characteristics of the population residing in the occupied region,
the nature of punishment that is being meted out to the protestors, and the structure of enforcement
costs that lead to these outcomes, are discussed in the paper.
JEL Classication Numbers: D72, D74, D78.
Keywords: Conict, Protest, Revolt.
1 Introduction
1.1 Aims and objectives
The aim of this paper is to analyze how the nature of a national protest or liberation movement, against
external occupation, might be a¤ected by the nature of decision-makers on both sides of the conict. On one
side of the conict, there are the protest leaders leading the protest movement against occupation. On the
other side, there are the leaders of the occupying force (maybe a government or a prime decision-maker). This
paper is motivated by two seemingly counter-intuitive outcomes that have been known to occur historically,
namely: (i) a protest leader whose opportunity cost may be very high, but he or she still very actively leads
a powerful protest movement; (ii) an occupier whose intrinsic level of aggression is very high, but he or she
still faces a strong protest. Based on these two observations, two corresponding questions are studied in this
paper. First, how is the nature of a protest movement a¤ected by the opportunity costs of the protest leaders
who lead these movements? Second, how is the nature of the protest movement a¤ected by the degree of
I am grateful to Oscar Volij and Brent Kreider for their comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer
applies.
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hawkishness of the leaders of occupiers? In order to simplify the analysis, I will henceforth assume that the
protest movement is led by a representative leader, known as the protest leader. On the other hand, I
assume the occupying force is lead by a central authority, henceforth known as the occupier.
Before proceeding further, let me clarify what I mean by the phrase nature of a protest movement. In the
model analyzed in this paper, the nature of a protest movement (or uprising) is described by: (i). The level
of activity by the protest leader; and (ii). The level of mass participation by the population of the occupied
region. In this context, when I mention the level of activity by the protest leader, I am not asserting
that the protest leader undertakes any specic kind of activity. His activity, which I have tried to broadly
capture in this model, may include a certain combination (in various degrees) of propaganda, holding rallies
or marches, non-cooperation, direct attacks, and other acts seen in revolts - which are used to inspire the
public to join the movement. The simplifying assumptions in this regard will be made clear in my model.
What is the motivation behind the rst question related to opportunity costs? Opportunity costs of protest
leaders include both economic and non-economic cost components like nancial, professional, psychological,
moral, familial and social costs. Given the di¤erent social, economic, professional and political backgrounds
of protest leaders in history, their opportunity costs for leading protest movements, have been di¤erent.
This is observed by studying the contrasting leadership elements in the Indian Freedom Struggle, the Irish
Republican Movement, the Israel-Palestinian Conict, the Kashmir Separatist Movement, and numerous
others. For example, in the case of the Indian Independence Struggle, the moral values of Gandhi and the
socioeconomic background of Nehru (hence their opportunity costs of protest) were quite di¤erent from those
of the previous leaders of the Congress Party.1 Yet they were able to lead a more successful independence
struggle, with greater mass-support, compared to the latter. Historical facts like these lead us to the rst
question. As will be seen from the model, it is possible for leaders with greater opportunity cost to be more
active and lead protests with more mass-support. Possibilities for such a seemingly counter-intuitive outcome
may arise in a multi-agent game because the leadersstrategy may depend not only on their opportunity
cost, but also on the strategy of the occupier. One of the contributions of this paper lies in identifying
the specics of the environment that make this outcome possible. It is identied how certain factors, like
the intrinsic population characteristics of the occupied area, the nature of the punishment inicted on the
protest leaders, and enforcement costs, contribute to these outcomes.
The second question, related to the degree of pacism of the occupier, is driven by the fact that in many
real world conicts, the command of occupying forces has been transferred between governments that have
di¤erent attitudes towards the protestors. For example, the Labor governments in Israel have generally been
more pacist compared to Likud governments in dealing with Palestinian uprisings. In this paper I have
1 I discuss this matter extensively, later in the paper.
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characterized, among others, equilibria where having a more hawkish occupier may lead to a de-escalation
of the protest. As before, I have identied the primitives (including the population characteristics and the
nature of punishment) that give rise to these equilibria.
1.2 Background
In order to study the questions raised in this paper, I have modeled a two-stage game, in which a protest
leader and the external occupier ght over the control of the population mass of the occupied region, with
the occupier having a rst-mover advantage and the protest leader moving in the second stage of the game.
This game is described in Section 2. 2 Important contributions in this area include Grossmans (1991) model
of insurrections and his study of kleptocracy and revolution (1991). Roemers (1985) article, in which he
rationalizes revolutionary ideology as a strategic device of the revolutionary leaders (rather than any intrinsic
pre-commitment on their part), is also signicant. Kuran (1989) identies that preference falsication by
the masses might be a reason why some of the major revolutions in history seem to be sudden occurrences,
without prior warnings of social discontent. Esteban & Ray (1999) discuss the links between the level and
pattern of social conict and the level of polarization in society.
In a notable contribution, Sandler and Siqueira (2007) study the role of deterrence versus preemption in
the ght against global terrorism. The authors develop a model of counter-terrorism operations by targeted
nations when a nations property and people can fall victim to terrorists both at home and abroad. Counter-
terrorist operations can be deterrent or preemptive in nature. For the purposes of my paper, Sandler and
Siqueiras analysis of the counter-terrorism operations of countries, using Stackelberg type leader-follower
behavior, is of much comparative interest, given the similarity in analytical techniques. The authors use the
notions of strategic complementarity and substitutability between the actions of targeted nations, to study the
e¢ ciency implications of their strategies. They conclude that such behavior lessens ine¢ ciency for deterrence
but worsen ine¢ ciency for preemption. My paper also utilizes the notions of strategic complementarity
and substitutability to characterize important results. The e¤ectiveness of such characterization has been
demonstrated by Sandler and Siqueiras paper, and in my case facilitates intuitive understanding of the
results, and employment of useful diagrammatic tools. A feature of Sandler and Sequeiras paper is that the
countries ghting terrorism (the players in their model) have symmetric payo¤ functions. However, as will
be seen later, the players in my model are non-symmetric" with respect to their utility functions. Further,
they vie for the control of an occupied region, making their goals much more at odds with one another, than
the players in Sandler and Siqueiras model (where the nations stand to gain, at least to a certain extent,
from the decisions of other nations). In particular, the interesting comparison of the e¢ ciency implications
2Other authors have also used sequential games to study various aspects of conict, protest, revolution and repression. For
surveys of this literature see Hartley and Sandler (1995), Garnkel and Skaperdas (1996), Sandler and Hartley (2004).
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of simultaneous-move versus leader-follower type games, made by Sandler and Siqueira are not present in
my paper for two reasons: (i). The non-symmetry of the players makes such a comparison di¢ cult; and (ii).
The concept of e¢ ciency is more readily dened (and more relevant) in the context of provision of global
security against terrorism, than in the context of protests in disputed regions.3
Recent contributions by Chang, Potter, and Sanders (2007a & b) and Chang and Sanders (2009) have
analyzed conict in disputed territories, particularly with regard to the scope of third-party intervention in
reducing conict, along the lines of earlier work by Siqueira (2003). The rst two contributions have very
interesting implications for the peaceful outcomes of territorial disputes (depending on the destructiveness of
the conict process), and the interplay of third-party intervention technology" with conict technology".
The main di¤erence between these papers and the current paper lies in the fact that the environment laid out
in them, in my opinion, is best suited to analyze conict between nation-states or principalities involved in war
over disputed territories (as the authors identify, in their examples of the India-Pakistan inter-state dispute
and the Bosnian conict). The environment laid out in the current paper, however, seems more suitable
for examining conicts in disputed or occupied territories when the source of conict lies from within - i.e.
when there is a self-determination movement comprising of the populace of the disputed territory facing up
to the occupier. The last paper, Chang and Sanders (2009), is even more interesting in the context of this
current paper, as it seeks to explore the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes in
a conict in a disputed region, such that the strength of the rebel group is diminished or the rebellion is
deterred altogether. My paper will present an alternate policy option to interventionist third-parties - that of
making the cost of suppressing the rebellion greater for the occupier, particularly when the self-determination
movement is led by moderate leaders.
The above literature recognizes the importance of leadership in the revolutionary process. However, to the
best of my knowledge, these contributions have not adequately studied the impact of opportunity costs of
revolutionary leaders on the conict process.4 Thus, one of the contributions of this paper lies in the incor-
poration of opportunity costs (where such costs might even be non-pecuniary or non-economic in nature).
Further, how conict processes have been inuenced by the degree of hawkishness of the occupier, is also an
3Other than the actions of nations combating terrorism, there have also been studies of the e¢ cient provisioning of global
security to combat other common threats. For example, Gupta (2010) studies the e¢ cient provisioning of global security to
combat threats from rogue nations.
4Though some (Grossman, 1991 & 1999, and Hirshleifer, 2000, among others) have recognized that the presence of competing
productive activities would impact the participation of the masses (peasant or worker families in Grossmans papers) in
revolutionary activities. The focus of Grossmans papers, however, is to model the behavior of the masses in the revolutionary
process - and not the behavior of revolutionary leaders. Further, it is interesting to note that Grossman does not explicitly
include the role of punishment in his model of insurrection - an aspect included in this paper. Roemer (1985) does incorporate
punishment in his model of revolution (as part of which he models the decision process of revolutionary leaders), but disregards
the presence of competing productive opportunities for the revolutionaries. Hirshleifer (2000) models conict between rival
rulers in his study of conict technology, but ignores the behavior of the rulerssubjects. Further, Hirschliefers model does not
incorporate the notion of punishment, as it primarily analyzes conict in the context of territorial conquest and expansion.
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issue that has not received due attention in the literature. Yet, as seen in the earlier discussion of historical
facts, these factors are present and pertinent in most anti-occupation struggles. A clear understanding of
the impact of these factors is crucial to the understanding of such conicts. The current paper seeks to ll
this gap in the literature. As already mentioned, I will demonstrate that the answers to the two questions
analyzed in this paper depend a great deal on certain underlying population characteristics, and the nature
of punishment that is being inicted. To the best of my knowledge, this paper is unique in demonstrating
the connection between these fundamental population characteristics, the intrinsic nature of punishment,
the opportunity cost of protest leaders, and the pacism of the occupier - in determining the nature of a
protest movement.
In order to correctly place this paper in the conict literature, it is important to distinguish protests in
occupied regions5 from other forms of conict, most notably terrorism, and to a lesser extent, guerilla
warfare. If terrorist methods and guerilla warfare are considered as tactics of conict, I will discuss how
protest leaders may use both of them, under certain circumstances. However, there are many options other
than terrorism and guerilla warfare (including non-violent options) that are available to protest leaders.
More to the point, in my model I analyze the intensity of actions" of the protest leaders in winning over
the populace of the occupied territory to their cause. I make no predictions about the exact tactic that will
be chosen. While terrorist actions and successful guerilla warfare against the occupier might both inspire
the population to join the cause, other tactics might also lead to successful (perhaps more successful) mass
movements.
As a tactic, terrorism threatens a target group not directly involved in the political decision-making process.
However, if a government fails to protect its constituents, its legitimacy is threatened (see Sandler and
Hartley (1995)). Kirk (1983) distinguishes terrorism from revolution in the fact that the immediate objective
of terrorist acts is one of intimidation rather than the overthrow of the existing government. Going by
Kirks denition, it is easy to see the di¤erence between terrorism and insurgency in occupied regions.
However, in light of the fact that terrorism has been used by the Hamas against Israeli targets in the Israeli-
Palestinian conict, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamils Elam in Sri Lanka, among others, a discussion
on the topic is warranted in the context of protests in occupied regions. First, terrorist attacks by protest
leaders carried out on the civilian populace within the occupied territory would have a limited impact on
the occupying government, and might be used only as an ultimate attention-grabbing tool, or to terrorize
the indigenous population into switch allegiance to the protest movement (though it might, as readily, drive
popular sentiment away from the protest movement).6 Second, terrorist attacks on the soil of the occupiers
5This protest might take various forms of expression, both violent and non-violent in nature.
6The Irish Republican Army has on occasion carried out assassinations of Irish nationals suspected of collaborating with
British, as examples to the rest of the population.
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country (transnational terrorism)7 will perhaps make as a bold statement to the indigenous populace that
the leaders seek to convert.8 Finally, terrorist attacks against the occupiers assets might have a motivational
impact (over and above the direct damage, of course).9 However, it must be stressed that while terrorism
might indeed be one of the tactics ultimately chosen by protest leaders in occupied regions, it will be only
one among a host of tactics under consideration at the outset. The protest leaders in my model are not
terrorists to begin with, especially as they may have intrinsic moral opportunity costsof violent behavior,
but may be forced to adopt such tactics in the face of repression. In any case, my model does not make
predictions on the exact tactics of the protest leadership, but only on the intensity of whichever tactic they
choose. While under certain circumstances it might be possible to hypothesize that those tactics might be
violent, or even terrorist in nature, there is a huge di¤erence in a terrorists choice of how to go about his
attacks, and a protest leaders choice of the best method to achieve the goal of freedom.10 Particularly,
from a terrorism viewpoint, support by the population mass of the contested territory is not a matter under
consideration - however, for someone leading an independence movement, it is a signicant point. Hence,
the choice of a tactic that might alienate the mass base must surely rank among less desirable options.
Guerilla tactics involving armed attacks on the occupiers bases and partial takeovers of territory, may also
be used by the leader of a protest movement. A protest leader may indeed use guerilla tactics, if he were to
choose a violent method of protest. However, as the reader might have already guessed, these tactics will be
only one among a host of violent and non-violent tactics originally considered by the protest leader, while
making his choice. As mentioned before, my model does not make predictions on the tactics of the protest
leadership, but only on the intensity of the chosen tactic (though I will have more to say on this later).
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 analyzes protest and its control as a two-player game
between the occupier and protest leader. Section 3 analyzes how the nature of a protest movement is a¤ected
by the opportunity costs of the protest leader and the hawkishness of the occupier. Section 4 discusses the
results of the paper and policy implications. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Protest and its Control as a Two Player Game
2.1 Players, decision variables, and the payo¤ structure
There are two players, the protest leader and the occupier. The decision variables of these players are an
activity leveland permissiveness levelrespectively. Let a and c denote these respective decision variables.
7The terror bombing of targets within Israel by Hamas militants provide an example of this tactic.
8Chalmers and Shelton (1975) suggest that a governments repression of non-violent acts would ceteris paribus lower the
price of violent acts, and lead to more of the latter.
9This might actually be part of guerilla tactics discussed below.
10Kirks (1983) analysis of the terroristschoosing between non-violent and violent methods as cost-e¤ective means of max-
imizing net gains from rent-seeking, is somewhat similar in this regard. However, in my model, the inclusion of opportunity
costs of violent behavior makes the protest leaders intrinsically shy of terrorist methods.
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Let a 2 [0; 1]  A; and c 2 [0; 1]  A0, with the respective end values being the least and the highest possible
level in either case. The objective of both players is to maximize their own payo¤ arising from the revenues
and costs that will arise due to their own action and that of their opponent. I will discuss below how such
revenues and costs are generated. An environment of perfect information and common knowledge is assumed
throughout the paper.
The protest leader and the occupier are the key players in the model. There is also a xed population
mass residing in this region. A certain percentage of the total population mass gets converted to protest,
depending on the playersstrategies.11
Let f denote the conversion function, which maps every pair (a; c) to a population percentage in the interval
[0; 100]:12
f : AA0  ! [0; 100]
The function f is assumed to have the following properties:
A1. Conversion E¤ect of Activity: f is strictly increasing and concave in a, i.e., fa > 0; faa < 0:
A2. Conversion E¤ect of Permissiveness: f is strictly increasing and convex in c, i.e., fc > 0; fcc > 0:
The rst assumption states that the decision of a greater level of protest activity by the leader converts a
greater percentage of the population to protest.13 More activity by the leader might persuade more people
to join his cause.14 For the sake of simplicity, it is useful to think of a as the intensity of the messages" from
the protest leader, conveyed through various activities or actions" (remaining agnostic about the nature of
such activities for modeling purposes). It is assumed that there are decreasing marginal returns to a with
respect to conversion. In other words, the conversion function behaves like a usual production function, as
far as input a is concerned.
The second assumption states that if the occupier is more permissive, for a given decision level of activity by
the protest leader, then the population mass takes advantage of that fact and converts to protest in greater
numbers. It may be reasonably argued that there are increasing marginal returns to conversion with regard
to the level of permissiveness of the occupier.
Note that the nature of the conversion function gives information regarding the nature of the population of
11 In what follows we ignore the free-rider problem associated with collective action. In reality, such problems have been
overcome in many historical contexts. We refer the reader to Sandler (1992), for a survey of various means by which the
collective action problem has been overcome in numerous situations.
12This function bears resemblance to the contest success functionsused by Skaperdas (1996), and Hirshleifer (2000). It is to
be noted, though, that contest success functions are essentially probability functions, denoting the chance of success in contests.
13 It may be assumed that the leader asks the converted mass to engage in a certain given level or kind of protest activity.
14There is another way in which assumption A1 may be justied. Under certain situations, a leader with a higher decision
level of activity might be able to coerce a greater percentage of the population to side with him, especially if that activity is
violent in nature. In that case, the populace might be more fearful of her than a leader with a lower decision level (of violence).
In such a scenario, though the population may not itself be indulging in protest activities, they would be lending tacitsupport
out of fear to the violence undertaken by the leader. This situation is in fact akin to the situation in Kashmir during 2002,
where militants coerced the population by indulging in violent activities, both against the population and the controlling forces.
This created an atmosphere of terror under which the population was fearful of participating in democratic activities. This fact
of non-participation was then used by the militant organizations in international fora to gain political mileage.
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the occupied region. For example, how susceptible is the population to revolutionary propaganda? This can
be measured, for specied functional forms, by the elasticity of the conversion function with respect to a.
How would the population react to a lessening of controls by the occupier? It is possible to measure this by
the elasticity of the conversion function with respect to c, for specied functional forms.
Depending on the percentage of the population converted to protest, a certain amount of revenue (political
gains for example) R accrues to the protest leader and R0 to the occupier. For the protest leader, it is
assumed this revenue is a linear function of f;R = !f . The occupiers revenue level R0 depends on the
percentage of the population not converted to protest and is R0 = (100  f), where  > 0.
I will now describe the playerscosts. These costs from their own action and that of their opponent. There
is a punishment functionp which maps every pair (a; c) to a punishment level P 2 [0;1):The function p
describes the technology of punishment. Punishment is a cost for the protest leader and is administered by
the occupier.
p : AA0  ! [0;1)
Let P = p(a; c) where  is a scaling parameter. So, punishment P is a monotonic transformation of p.
The function p is assumed to reect the following properties:
A3. Punishment E¤ect of Activity: p is strictly increasing and convex in a, i.e., pa > 0; paa > 0:
A4. Punishment E¤ect of Permissiveness : p is strictly decreasing and convex in c, i.e., pc < 0; pcc > 0:
It is assumed that given a level of permissiveness, punishment increases for an increase in activity. Also, the
punishment schedule p is such that the marginal rate of punishment increases with the level of activity.
The assumption of punishment e¤ect of permissiveness is based on the logic that any credible punishment
level should depend not only on the level of activity of the protest leadership, but also on the occupiers action.
This assumption requires that for any level of activity by the protest leader the punishment delivered is more,
if the occupier was less permissive. Now, what is measured by the permissiveness parameter c? Parameter c
measures (or signals) the level of control of the occupied territory by the occupier, and may be approximated
by military or police provision by the controller.15 A larger military or police presence would lead to less
permissiveness, or a lower c in our model. Further, we assume that punishment decreases at an increasing
rate for greater permissiveness.16
15To deliver a certain level of punishment (for a given activity level) there needs to be an appropriate force to apprehend
the protestors. In other words, the level of policing is very important - the size of the police and military, their equipage, and
proper deployment is essential in apprehending the protestors. These combined features are captured in the variable c; the level
of permissiveness.
16To the best of my knowledge, the use of permissiveness" as a decison variable by the controller, is a novel aspect of my
model. Models of conict usually have warring parties choose an amount of o¤ensive e¤ort or force with which to combat
their enemies. Though the choice of force and the choice of permissiveness might be two sides of the same coin, my choice of
the decision variable of the controller is driven by the particular situation studied in this paper - namely protests in occupied
territories. A survey of history shows foreign occupation to almost always start with the presence of a devastating level of force
on part of the occupier, which makes the occupied territory into a garrison state. As time goes by, the occupier decides to let
up" to a certain extent. Protests against the occupier are often embarked upon, depending on this tolerance" of the occupier.
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Examining the punishment function, the level of actual punishment that might be credibly meted out would
depend on the actions of both the players. The punishment function recognizes that the activities of both
the concerned parties need to be taken into account, since actual punishment would not only depend on
protest activity, but also on the level of policing. For further discussions on desirable features of punishment
technologysee Becker (1968) and Mookherjee & Png (1994). We note that the punishment function gives
information regarding the characteristics of the punishment being delivered by the occupier. For example,
are successive increases in punishment very harsh for increases in protest activity (which may be measured
by the elasticity of the conversion function with respect to a)? If the occupier reduces the size of its army, is
its ability to punish greatly diminished (which may be measured by the elasticity of the conversion function
with respect to c)? I also assume that p(0; c) > 0, for any c < 1: That is, without any level of activity,
the occupation itself is a cost to the protest leader. This is a property that distinguishes terror and guerilla
warfare from insurgency. Moreover, in what follows, this will also imply that the occupying force is a cost
to the occupier regardless of whether any action takes place or not. The implication of this is that the
equilibrium level of activity by the protest leaders will always be positive, unless punishment levels were
suitably extreme at the rst sign of dissent and the general populace are su¢ ciently non-responsive to the
activities of the protest leaders. Realistically speaking, there is a low chance of a corner solution arising in
the theoretical model presented below.
Lastly, there are no special restrictions on the cross-partials of the conversion and punishment functions,
or fac T 0 and pac T 0. These assumptions regarding the conversion and punishment functions mean that
as permissiveness increases, the marginal e¤ect of activity by the leadership on conversion and punishment
may either increase or decrease. Thus, more permissiveness might or might not increase the receptiveness of
the population to the activities of the protest leader. Similarly, as more permissive environment might mean
that punishment is less for protest activities in absolute terms, but the marginal increase for more activity
might not necessarily be lower.
I will now discuss a very important feature of the model. There is a opportunity costC of activity by the
protest leader, in addition to the punishment cost mentioned earlier. There is a function which maps every
a 2 [0; 1] to a opportunity cost space C, or C =  g(a) where  is a nite positive scalar. Opportunity costs
are increasing and convex in the level of activity, i.e. ga > 0; gaa > 0: The incorporation of this opportunity
cost distinguishes our model from those of previous authors. One of the main contributions of this paper is
to analyze the e¤ect of this opportunity cost on the nature of the protest movement, so I will discuss the
source of these costs in some detail. These costs may be divided into: (i). Psychological or moral costs; (ii).
Economic and professional costs; (iii). Social costs; and (iv). Networking costs.
This paper tries to capture this unique aspect of reality seen in occupied territories.
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(i). Psychological or moral costs: These costs arise from personal convictions or religious beliefs of the
leaders. For example, leaders of mass movements like Mahatma Gandhi in India and Daniel OConnell in
Ireland had personal or religious beliefs against violence. This is not true of many radical leaders, for example
those belonging to the Hamas Movement in the Israeli-Palestinian conict. The cost calculus entailed by
these beliefs would certainly enter into the decisions of leaders of mass movements and would a¤ect the
stridency of their message. This is especially true when the leaders have little control over the minor
activists participating in the movement. Then, the stridency of the leaders message would to some extent
be tempered by the knowledge that a more strident message, while encouraging a larger mass participation,
would by its very nature also lead a higher chance of violence (leading to higher moral cost for the leader).
A historical example makes this clear. In 1922, in response to Mahatma Gandhis strident call for the ouster
of the British from India, a non-violent Non-Cooperation Movement was in full swing, with hundreds of
thousands participating. However, on February 4, 1922, a minor mob of protestors set re to a police station
in the small town of Chauri Chaura and killed twenty three policemen trapped inside. This incident was
so morally repugnant to Gandhi that he cancelled the Non-Cooperation Movement, e¤ectively ending the
quest towards independence for some time. Thus, the opportunity cost of the independence movement was
too much for Gandhi, in this case.
This brings us to an important question: is there a di¤erence in the opportunity cost for a violent protest
versus a non-violent protest for a moral leader? The answer certainly is yes. The moral leader has a much
higher opportunity cost in case the protest turns violent. However, given the example of the Indian Non-
Cooperation Movement, the important point that I would stress on is that even when leaders explicitly urge
non-violence, too strident a message against the occupier might cause violence (especially in the context
of large mass movements involving a volatile or eager public, each element of which cannot be directly
controlled). Thus, even when protest leaders admittedly urge non-violent protest, they might need to
moderate their rhetoric against occupiers for a large mass protest to remain completely non-violent. There
may be a di¤erence between just advocating non-violent protest, and actually reigning in the rhetoric to
ensure that it in fact remains so.17 This point is important in the context of my theoretical model, which
does not comment on the exact tactics of the protest leadership. Rather, my model analyzes the mechanics
behind the choice of intensity of whichever tactic (activity) they use, to win over converts to their cause.
(ii). Economic and professional costs: The literature on conict recognizes economic opportunity costs as one
17The process I am trying to model here is a static snapshot of a protest movement, as opposed to a revolution. This protest
movement would be akin to an insurgency. Such insurgencies may be violent or non-violent in nature, and the leaders of the
movement will have the same opportunity cost considerations that I have outlined above. As an aside, a cursory study of
history indicates revolutions always hold a high probability of bloodshed (even if such bloodshed is not ultimately realized).
This obviously might mean that a moral leader would have a natural proclivity against revolutions (though, of course, such a
leader undertaking revolution as a rational choice cannot be ruled out).
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of drivers behind the decision to participate in insurgent activities.18 This would be true not only for minor
participants, but also for leaders. It is reasonable that if the leaders of protest movements had economic and
professional opportunities as doctors, lawyers, academics, etc. open to them, which would be lost if they
increased their protest activities too much, they would take that cost into account. On the other hand, the
lack of such opportunities would reduce these costs. Also, these costs are not just limited to the professional
classes, but to leaders arising out of other walks of life, having settled livelihoods and strong connections to
property, home, and hearth.
(iii). Social costs: There are social opportunity costs of leading protest movements, for leaders who have social
ties to the occupiers. For example, in the Indian Independence Movement, Jawaharlal Nehrus opportunity
cost of leading the independence movement had a great deal of social cost for him. Nehru was educated in
Britain in the best public schools, select colleges, and was elected to the Bar. Moreover, he was intimate in
the highest British social circles. So, his decision to engage in anti-British activities had certain opportunity
costs for him. These costs increased as he distanced himself more and more from the British by engaging
more and more in the independence struggle. Needless to say, these opportunity costs were not present for
other leaders without Nehrus social connections. Again, social costs are not limited to connections with the
occupier, but extends to other kinds of connections and ties to the social fabric that a protest leader has.
(iv). Networking costs: This is the cost borne by the protest leader to spread his message to the masses.
Examples may include the costs of maintaining a political network or the apparatus to spread the insurgent
message. Further, it may be argued that this cost rises as the intensity of the insurgent message rises - as
more persuasion is needed to spread a message of higher intensity to the masses. It may also be assumed
that a relatively unknown leader, or a leader with less social connections and mass base, low prole, or
una¢ liated with a mainstream political party, has a much higher networking (opportunity) cost than one
who is more advantaged in these respects. The importance of this opportunity cost should not be overlooked,
and it drives the intuition behind one of the major results seen in this paper (proposition 2).
Thus, opportunity costs for leading mass movements may be substantial for protest leaders, and must enter
into their rational decision process. As mentioned, this paper explicitly takes this factor into account.
Coming to the cost structure of the occupier, there is an enforcement costE for administering punishment
to the leadership group. This cost is given by E(P ) = P . This cost includes not only the pecuniary costs
of provisioning the army, but also other non-pecuniary costs like international sanctions and boycotts that
the occupier faces for taking action against the protestors.19
18See Frey and Luechinger (2003) for a discussion in the context of terrorism.
19A real-world example of such non-pecuniary costs would be the international pressures faced by Israel for its actions to
control Palestinian uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Of course, international sanctions may have pecuniary losses
(like loss in international trade) as well.
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Using notation developed above, the payo¤ of the protest leader can be written as:
(a; c) = R  C   P = !f   C   P = !f(a; c)   g(a)  p(a; c)
The occupiers payo¤ is:
(a; c) = R0   E = (100  f)  P
= [100  f(a; c)]  p(a; c), where  = 
Do protest leaders and the occupiers in the actual world really try to maximize payo¤ functions similar to
the ones described above? While there is little doubt that considerations of punishment and costs would
gure in their decisions, there might be some debate whether these players would attach much importance
to the level of population being converted to protest. Even though there is a connection between the success
of a protest movement and the level of mass participation, critics might argue that the exact nature of this
connection is open to debate. Their argument might be that the fundamental objective of the protest leader is
to achieve independence, so her payo¤ function should explicitly reect this particular objective, rather than
the objective of converting the population to protest. While acknowledging some of the criticsconcerns,
I believe that the payo¤ functions outlined above capture the essence of the day-to-day decision making
processes of the leaders in many independence movements. As an example, in the Indian Independence
Movement, for a long period the ultimate goal of independence seemed to be distant and elusive. The daily
focus and activities of the independence leaders was geared more towards disseminating the idea of self-rule
and building a nationwide mass movement.20 As this paper does not seek to model the entire revolutionary
process, from conception to culmination, but only seeks to capture a snapshot of the process (in which I
analyze certain characteristics of an ongoing movement), the payo¤ functions used in the model are suitable.
Figure 1 illustrates the iso-utility maps of the protest leader (Panel 1) and the controller (Panel 2), as entailed
by the payo¤ functions above. In panel 1, the protest leaders utility level increases in the vertical direction
with a movement from iso-utility curve U1 to U2 to U3, so on. This is because for any level of a, greater c
leads to greater utility for the protest leader. Alternatively, holding c constant, utility rises and then falls
with an increase in a. In panel 2, the controllers utility level increases towards the left direction with a
movement from iso-utility curve U01 to U
0
2 to U
0
3. For any level of c, less a leads to greater utility for the
controller. Alternatively, holding a constant, utility rises and then falls with an increase in c:
2.2 The two person game and its solution
It seems logical to model the game between the protest leader and the occupier as a sequential, rather than a
simultaneous move game. A huge army or police force is usually in place beforehand in occupied territories.
The occupier usually chooses to retain its troop level or cut it, thereby signalling permissiveness. Protests
20The focus of the Non-Cooperation Movement (1918-22) against the British, led by Gandhi, seems to be an example of this.
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 c
    1
                                                         U3     U2
       U1
     0                                                                             1        a
Panel 1. The iso-utility map of the protest leadership
c
   1
        U3’  U2’    U1’
     0                                                                             1        a
Panel 2. The iso-utility map of the controller
Figure 1: The iso-utility maps
take place, even after the protestors account for the police presence.21 In order to model this situation,
I will consider a two-stage perfect information game, with the occupier acting in the rst stage and the
protest leader doing so in the second stage. The players get to act only once in this model. The occupier
has complete information about the protest leaders best response to its own strategy. After observing the
occupiers action, the protest leader maximizes his payo¤ in the second stage of the game.
I will solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-player game through backward induction. In the
second stage, the protest leader solves the problem:
Maximize:fag  = !f(a; c)   g(a)  p(a; c); 0  a  1
such that:   0:
The FOC for an interior solution to the protest leaders problem is:
!fa(a; c
)   ga(a)  pa(a; c) = 0
The solution to the above equation gives the reaction function of the protest leader:
a = a(c; !;  ; )
Lemma 1. @a

@ < 0 always.
22
This implies that if the cost of activity increases, ceteris paribus, the protest leader will curtail activity.
Lemma 2. The reaction function of the protest leader is positively (negatively) sloped, i.e. @a

@c ? 0; i¤
!fac   pac ? 0:23
When the reaction function is positively (negatively) sloped, a and c are strategic complements (substitutes)
21 In a related context, robbers look at the level of police patrols in a area, and then decide on the extent of their illegal
activities.
22As @a

@ 
=
ga
!faa  gaa paa ; the result follows from the assumptions regarding the partials.
23Since @a

@c = hc =  
!:fac :pac
!:faa  :gaa :paa and the denominator is always negative.
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for the protest leaders.24
Case 1 (Strategic Complementarity): We see that for strategic complementarity, there should be a positive
marginal gain in the protest leaders payo¤ for an increase in permissiveness, even with some increase in his
activity. A look at the condition strategic complementarity, seen in lemma 2 above, is instructive. In this
case, the conversion function f reacts positively enough to greater action by the leader in a more permissive
environment to counter any increase in punishment that might occur due to increased action (note that
punishment can increase in this situation to a certain extent, even with greater permissiveness). It may be
argued that the populace of this region are kept in check in the face of strict control , but quick to take
advantage of opportunities to participate in the insurgency.
Case 2 (Strategic Substitutability): On the other hand, for strategic substitutes, there would be a positive
gain for increase in permissiveness, only by cutting back on activity. Thus, in this case, the conversion
function f does not react positively enough to greater action by the leader, even in a more permissive
environment. Intuitively, this might happen in the real world when a su¢ cient portion of the general
populace is impressed by the municence of the occupier to distance themselves from the insurgency, or are
indi¤erent to the freedom movement due to other social or historical causes. In fact, su¢ cient oppression is
needed for a signicant portion of the populace to consider the message of insurgency.25 Thus, in a more
permissive environment, the protest leaders seeking to maximize payo¤ would have to cut back on activity,
which would substantially reduce their punishment from the occupier. If however, permissiveness were to
decline, more activity would be substituted for permissiveness to maximize payo¤ levels. Intuitively, less
permissiveness would cause the punishment level of the protest leader to go up, so the protest leader would
try to gain converts (and maximize his payo¤), even though more activity would entail greater punishment.
Though lower permissiveness, ceteris paribus, brings lesser converts - by increasing activity su¢ ciently (in
an environment where the e¤ectiveness of a increases, i.e. the populace is more receptive to the insurgent
message), enough converts might be won to make such a strategy optimal (ex post to the decrease in
permissiveness).
24See Eaton (2001; 2004) and Gal-Or (1985) for denitions of strategic substitutability/complementarity, as well as plain
substitutability/complementarity. In particular, Eaton (2004) characterizes social dilemmas as games of plain comple-
ments/substitutes and strategic complements/substitutes. Based on various combinations of plain and strategic complementar-
ity/substitutability seen in social dilemmas, Eaton is able to comment on rst or second mover" advantages in stage games.
My model di¤ers from Eaton, as the players payo¤ functions are not symmetric. Incidentally, note that an increase in per-
missiveness c by the controller increases the payo¤ of the protest leader, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, an increase in
the activity a of the protest leader decreases the payo¤ of the controller, ceteris paribus. Hence, it is not possible to directly
apply the concepts of plain substitutability/complementarity seen in Eaton (2001; 2004) in this model. However, the notions of
strategic substitutability/complementarity are readily usable, as is Eatons diagrammatic analysis for those cases, with minor
modications. The diagrammatic analysis provides us with an intuitive understanding of the theorems below.
25A word of caution - I do not imply that more absolute numbers of people convert to protest in a more oppressive environment.
Peoples receptiveness to the protest leader goes up, so ceteris paribus the same level of activity by the leader would convert
more people. But a higher level of policing would make them afraid to join the protest. A combination of these two e¤ects
might mean that there are less converts in absolute terms - but this number is still more than the number that would have
converted under greater policing, had their receptiveness stayed the same. Hence there is scope for the leader to be more active,
and o¤set the higher punishment that he receives, in a more oppressive environment.
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The occupiers decision problem occurs in the rst stage of the game. The occupier solves:
Maximize:fcg  = [100  f(a; c)]  p(a; c); 0  c  1
such that:   0:
The FOC for an interior solution to the occupiers problem is:
 [fa + pa ]@a@c   [fc + pc)] = 0  F
The solution to this equation gives us c = c(a; ; ):
The subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is the strategy pair (a; c) which satisfy the simultaneous
solution of the FOCs of the protest leader and the occupier:26
Condition C2. As fa ; pa ; fc > 0; and pc < 0; a solution to the problem exists for @a

@c > 0 only if
 jpcj >  jfcj and for @a@c < 0 only if  jpcj <  jfcj at equilibrium.
This is because the term [fa +pa ] in the above expression is always positive, hence the term [fc+pc]
needs to be suitably positive or negative, according as ac is negative or positive for the FOC of the occupier
to hold in equilibrium.
In gure 2, we see the equilibrium when: (i). The reaction function of the protest leadership is positively
sloped (panel 1), and (ii). Its reaction function is negatively sloped (panel 2). The positive slope would arise
when the peaks of the successive iso-utility curves of the protest leadership, signifying higher utility levels,
are arranged in a south-westerly direction in the Cartesian plane. Conversely, negative slope would arise
when the peaks of the successive iso-utility curves of the protest leadership, signifying higher utility levels,
are arranged in a south-easterly direction in the Cartesian plane.27
A study of the diagrams in gure 2 is instructive. In the case of strategic complementarity, the equilibrium
entails a comparatively low level of permissiveness for the equilibrium level of activity. These facts are in
line with observation made earlier that in the case of strategic complementarity, the population is quick
to take advantage of the controllers leniency, and is initially held in check through strict controls. In this
environment, greater action by protest leaders is optimal only for greater permissiveness. On the other
hand, in the case of strategic substitutability, a comparatively high level of permissiveness is obtained for
the equilibrium level of activity. This would be in keeping with the situation where the population is non-
26For conditions for which there is a subgame perfect equilibrium to games of perfect information (as in this model) see
Harris (1985). The assumptions with respect to the second partials of the conversion, communication, and punishment cost
functions ensure that the payo¤ function of the protest leader is strictly concave in her strategies. I assume that the following
su¢ ciency condition for the strict concavity of the occupiers maximand function w.r.t. c is satised at (a; c):  [(faa +
paa )(ac)2 + (fa + pa )acc + (fcc + pcc)] < 0: The satisfaction of this condition does not violate the assumptions
regarding the partials of the conversion and punishment functions. For the reaction function of the protest leader being strictly
monotonic, the equilibrium to this game will be unique. Further, this second order condition can hold simultaneously with the
conditions outlined in the main propositions of the model, for su¢ ciently high values of fcc and pcc, even without imposing
strong restrictions on the values of acc:
27For the slopes of the reaction function of the protest leadership being positive or negative respectively, the iso-utility map
of the controller has to be as seen in the respective gures for the existence of an equilibrium to this game. Otherwise condition
C2 will be violated. Further, along the negatively (positively ) sloped stretches of the controllers iso-utility curves, fc+pc is
positive (negative). Combining this with condition C2 means that an upward sloping reaction function implies a low c and
vice versa.
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c          P (Reaction function of the protest leadership)
   1
c*                       S
        P
     0                 a*                                                        1        a
Panel 1. Equilibrium with a positively sloped reaction function.
c
    1     P
                    S
c*
                                                          P
0              a*                                                                1        a
Panel 2. Equilibrium with a negatively sloped reaction function.
Figure 2: Equilibrium: The two possible cases
committed to protest for the controller acting liberally, but is roused to disa¤ection when the controller is
harsh. In this environment, greater action by protest leaders is only optimal for lesser permissiveness.
3 Analytical Implications of the Model
3.1 The e¤ect of leadership type on the nature of protest
A protest leader having an intrinsically greater opportunity cost of decision at every level of protest activity
is dened as a higher-costleader.
Denition 1. (Higher-Cost Leader): Protest leader i is dened to be higher-costthan leader j if  i >  j.
Protest leader i having  i >  j has higher opportunity costs of any level of protest activity than leader
j. Recall that  is the weighting parameter of the opportunity cost function, in the payo¤ of the protest
leadership.
I will analyze below how the equilibrium level of protest activity and popular participation changes when a
movement is lead by a higher opportunity cost leadership, versus a lower opportunity cost one. For this, I
will consider the e¤ect of a variation of  on the equilibrium level of activity and mass participation. But
before performing this exercise, let me dene how the level of mass support for a protest movement will be
measured.
Remark. A protest movement is dened has greater mass-supportvis-a-vis another, if the level of conversion
f is higher in the former compared to the latter.
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The above remark simply states that the equilibrium level of conversion (measured by the equilibrium value
given by the conversion function) measures the level of mass support for the protest movement. A movement
with more mass support will have a higher f.
The following propositions characterize equilibria where activity rises for the leadership moving to the hands
of a higher-cost group. It will be observed that it is not automatic that a higher-cost leadership will indulge
in less activity.28 I will also analyze the mass supportlevel of the protest movement in each case. It will
be possible to comment on the nature of conversion and punishment functions that lead to these results. As
mentioned before, the nature of these functions shed light on the characteristics of the population,29 and the
type of punishment, that need to exist for these outcomes to occur.
Proposition 1: For a and c being strategic complements (i.e. @a

@c > 0) for the protest leader, a leader with
higher opportunity costs will be more active compared to ones with lower opportunity cost if: (i). @
2a
@ @c < 0;
(ii). 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2  at c; and (iii).@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these conditions, the protest movement has
greater mass-support for a higher-cost leader.
Proof: See appendix 1. 
From the above proposition, it is seen that the occupier may be more permissive for a higher cost leader-
ship. The proposition outlines the conditions that would make the occupier more permissive for a higher
opportunity cost leadership. I interpret these conditions below:
(i). There must be strategic complementarity of a and c. Recall from lemma 2 that the case of strategic
complementarity arises if the gain in conversion (in a situation of both greater activity and permissiveness)
more than o¤sets the change in punishment.30 As mentioned before, an intuitive reason for this would be
that the populace of this region is su¢ ciently quick to take advantage of the controllers leniency, which
coupled with the leaders insurgent activity (message) cause them to convert in su¢ cient numbers. This
more than o¤sets the the extra punishment that accrues to the protest leaders for more activity. Further,
the extra punishment entailed by higher activity by the protest leaders, is also not su¢ ciently harsh, given
a more permissive (political or security) climate.
(ii): The condition @
2a
@ @c < 0 implies that for a higher-cost leadership, the reaction function (@a
=@c)
should be steeper (if a is measured on the horizontal and c on the vertical axis of a graph), compared to
a lower-cost one (see gure 3 below). So, higher opportunity costs make the former less reactive to (or
less willing to take advantage of) greater permissiveness. The occupier certainly considers this fact when
28Note that any leader with  i >  j ts our denition of being higher-cost. The following propositions outline conditions
where a higher-cost leader (satisfying those conditions) would indulge in more activity. They do not claim that any higher-cost
leader would be more active. Indeed, that would not make sense, since for su¢ ciently large values of  , the cost of activity
would be so high that very low activity would result.
29For example, their susceptibility to the propaganda and other activities of the protest leader.
30Note that for an increase in both activity and permissiveness, punishment could either increase or decrease. For an increase,
an o¤estting increase in conversion would be required for the payo¤ of the protest leader to increase.
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deciding to be more permissive.
(iii). The condition 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2  implies that the rate of increase in enforcement costs will be higher
than the conversion rate, for a rise in the protest leaders activities. As the occupier does not want this
inationary pressure on enforcement costs to hugely deplete its payo¤, it increases permissiveness. Note
that it is possible for the occupier to increase permissiveness and cut back on punishment, hence saving
enforcement costs.31 Recall that in this particular case, the higher-cost protest leader is less reactive to
greater permissiveness. Thus, though this type of leader takes advantage of a permissive environment,
the increase in the subversive actions (or rhetoric) is not too excessive (hence there is not an explosive
uprising leading to an immediate ouster of the occupier). Given these facts, the occupier is able to save
on enforcement costs (and actually increase its payo¤ level) by becoming more permissive, and reducing
confrontation with the protest leader. In this scenario, with the occupier becoming more permissive when
faced with a higher-cost protest leader, the latter is more active than a lower-cost one.32
(iv). A nal condition needs to be satised for greater activity by the higher-cost leader. His opportunity
cost must not be too high. This makes sense, as for su¢ ciently large values of  , the opportunity cost would
be so high that we would observe very low activity. In fact, higher opportunity costs do have a negative
impact on the activity decision of a higher-cost leader. But, for the result outlined in proposition 1, these
costs must not be so high as to violate the condition
@a@c dcd  > @a@ . The left hand term in this inequality
denotes the positive e¤ect of the occupiers increasing permissiveness on activity level. The right hand
term denotes the negative e¤ect of greater opportunity cost on their activity 33 Finally, we observe that the
protest movement has greater mass-support under these circumstances, as both permissiveness and activity
level go up.
The result is represented graphically below in gure 3. As seen, the reaction function of the protest leadership
would shift left due for an increase in  , causing a movement in the equilibrium from S to S0. Both
permissiveness and protest activity increase. The payo¤ of the protest leaders go up due to this. The payo¤
of the controller goes up since it is able to save on the costs of inicting punishment.
The punchline of proposition 1 is that high opportunity cost protest leaders, leading a general population
quick to take advantage of leniency, are more likely to be successful compared to radical leaders in leading
workable protest movements, though inherently they may use more moderate forms of protest. A caveat here
31 If the controller becomes more permissive, he would cut back on the level of military or police presence. Logically, greater
permissiveness should lead to lower forces, as lower enforcement services are needed. Since military and police presence costs
money, cutbacks commensurate to the needed level of service is logical.
32 It must be remembered, though, that if the occupier were as permissive as this to a lower-cost leader then it would face
more activity in equilibrium. A lower-cost leader would indulge in less activity in equilibrium as she would face the deterrence
e¤ect of less permissiveness on the occupiers part.
33For explicit functional forms, the elasticities of the conversion and punishment functions with respect to a and c are crucial
in obtaining the result. The interested reader may obtain a numerical example from the author , which demonstrates the role
played by these elasticities.
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Figure 3: Case 1: Rise of a* due to a shift in a positive reaction function
is that there must be signicant cost to the occupier for harshly punishing these moderate leaders (which
might arise due to international third-party intervention).34 Some stylized facts of history provide a reality
check of the above ndings. During the Indian Independence movement, during the period 1900-47, many
leaders of the Congress Party had close social ties with the British. Others, like Gandhi, had moral attitudes
that made them have a high opportunity cost of escalating conict.35 Given their high opportunity costs
of indulging in protest, it was unlikely that the situation would get out of hand, even if the British were
more permissive. Also, some of these leaders like Gandhi and Nehru, had great international stature, and
the cost of punishing them harshly was very costly for the British.36 Given this, the British slowly eased
the pressure on them, and the Congress Party was able to lead a substantial movement.37 Also note that
the Indian middle class (which was the backbone of the Congress-led movement), was not warlike enough to
erupt in revolt against the amassed might of the British conquerors under strict oppression, but were quick
to take advantage of the easing political climate, and actively converted to the cause of independence in large
numbers during this time. Thus, to summarize, the British were lenient, the Congress Party was able to be
more active than its more aggressive counterparts, but moderated itself by not advocating a revolutionary
ouster of the British. In the end, the Congress Party led a hugely successful mass movement to win Indias
Independence, and yet retain cordial relations with the British. This situation is in sharp contrast to British
policy in India in the mid-1800s, when they faced uprisings by the remnants of Indias feudal class and
34This gives us some idea of the importance of international intervention in promoting moderate leadership in self-
determination movements, occurring in occupied regions.
35As mentioned earlier, Gandhi feared such escalation could cause the movement to get out of control, and result in violence,
which he was rmly against.
36The role played by the cost of punishment seems to be signicant. The leaders of the Bengal Revolutionary Movement in
India (1907-30) were also students and intellectuals, and had high opportunity costs. But as they did not have international
visibility, the enforcement cost against them (in terms of international condemnation, etc.), was not much. So the British
employed very repressive tactics against them.
37See Ghosh (1998), Sarkar (2001), and Sharma (2005) for accounts of the evolution of the Indian independence movement.
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rebellious units of the British Indian Army 38 The leaders of these uprisings did not have high opportunity
costs of insurgency, given that they were mostly dispossessed feudal nobility, and did not capture the popular
imagination of the greater Indian populace. The uprisings were quickly crushed with military force, and did
not spread. In fact, due to the aggressive response of the British, relatively few of the dispossessed nobility
actually revolted - the majority did not revolt.39
Proposition 2: For a and c being strategic substitutes (i.e. @a

@c < 0) for protest a leader, a leader with higher
opportunity costs will be more active compared to ones with lower opportunity cost if: (i). @
2a
@ @c > 0; (ii). @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2  at c; and (iii).@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these conditions, the protest movement has lower
mass-support for a higher-cost leader.
Proof: It can be veried that the proof of the rst part of the proposition is similar to the proof of proposition
1. To prove the second part of the statement suppose that the occupier was at utility level  for the lower-
cost group, i.e. when  was lower. In this case, for an increase in  , the occupier maximizes its utility
by decreasing c as its best response (the algebra from the rst part of this proof shows this). Let its utility
level in the latter case be 0. But 0 > ; as the occupier could have stayed at least at the utility level
, but chose not to do so. This is because if the occupier had remained at the initial level of c, given  
had increased, a would have fallen (since @a

@ < 0 always). Thus, given the assumptions of our model, the
occupier would have remained at least at . Therefore, the best-response reduction in c would only move
it to a higher utility level. Now given pc < 0; pa > 0, a rises, and c falls in equilibrium for a rise in  ,
0 >  only if (100   f) is greater, i.e. f is lower than the initial level. Hence, under the assumptions
outlined in the proposition the protest movement is less mass supported for a higher-cost leadership. 
Note from the proof of this proposition that the controller is less permissive to a higher-cost leader than a
lower-cost leader. This means that the occupier realizes the severe opportunity cost related disadvantages
of the higher-cost leader (compared to a low-cost one) and tries to stamp out the leader by being su¢ ciently
harsh (especially if the general populace does not react su¢ ciently adversely to harshness). The high-cost
leader tries to counter the harshness by being more active.40 Interpreting the conditions of this proposition
shows this case may arise when:
(i). a and c are strategic substitutes. In this case, if permissiveness declines, the protest leader will maximize
his payo¤ by increasing activity. Note that this would happen only if su¢ cient oppression is needed for a
signicant portion of the populace to consider the message of insurgency.
38The most signicant uprising against the British during this period, known as the Sepoy Mutiny or the First War of Indian
Independence, occurred in 1857.
39The feudal nobility in India still retained their traditional role as social leaders into the latter part of the 19th century.
40 If the controller were more harsh to a low-cost leader, the latter would be even more active, ex post, compared to the
high-cost leader. But this situation does not arrive, as optimal strategy for the controller is to be more lenient to the low-cost
leader (who is not so active, in equilibrium).
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(ii). In this case the condition @
2a
@ @c > 0 implies that for a higher-cost leadership, the reaction function
(@a=@c) is atter (if a is measured on the horizontal and c on the vertical axis of a graph), compared
to a lower-cost one. Thus a higher-cost leader will be more reactive than a lower cost leader to changes
in permissiveness by the controller. Recalling from the second part of the proof of this proposition that
the controller is less permissive to a higher-cost leader, a atter reaction function, combined with less
permissiveness, makes a high-cost leader more active (or strident) than a low-cost one.
(iii). The condition
 @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2 , is equivalent to the one seen in proposition 1. However, as a and c
are strategic substitutes in this case, the interpretation is a bit di¤erent. Given that the occupier decreases
c here, the protest leader will increase a. It has already been seen in this case, that under conditions of less
permissiveness, people become more susceptible to revolutionary propaganda or other activities. However,
the second condition states that in spite of that, the responsiveness of the population to revolutionary
activities (their conversion) should not be too high, beyond a point. Thus, in absolute terms their rate of
conversion to the protest movement due to an increase in a (or @
2f
@a2 ) should be su¢ ciently low. Particularly,
the rate of conversion should be su¢ ciently lower than the rise in the cost of punishment, brought about by
the lower permissiveness and higher activity.
(iv). Finally, note that higher opportunity costs lead to lesser proclivity for activity (i.e.@a

@ < 0). But here,
lesser permissiveness forces the protest leader to substitute (in order to maintain a certain level of conversion),
and be more active. In fact this substitution requirement should be so great as to outweigh the negative
e¤ect higher costs have on their activity (
@a@c dcd  > @a@  needs to hold). Under these circumstances, a
higher-cost leader will be more active - though she will lead a movement with lower mass support compared
to a lower-cost leader.
This result is represented graphically in gure 4. Note in the diagram that the utility of the higher-cost
protest leadership is less than the utility of a lower-cost one (as its reaction function PP is atter than
the PP reaction function of the lower-cost one). Further, the controller is able to move to a higher prot
level if a higher-cost protest leadership is operational. Notice that if PPwere not atter than PP, then
a leftward shift of the reaction function might have given a lower value of activity (compared to a0), when
permissiveness declines (from c0).
The punchline of proposition 2 is that high opportunity cost protest leaders are less likely to be successful
compared to lower-cost leaders in leading workable protest movements, when leading a population not prone
to revolution in the rst place, and not driven to revolt in su¢ cient numbers by the strident message of the
leaders (in spite of greater receptiveness to the revolutionary message in a harsher political environment).
However, in order to lead a semblance of a movement, these leaders will pursue strident activities. Note
that there must be low costs to the occupier for harshly punishing these leaders (which might arise due to
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Figure 4: Case 2: Rise in a* due to shift in negative reaction function
these leaders being relatively unknown at the national and international level). Intuitively, this case can
happen in case where high opportunity costs arise from networking disadvantages (see the discussion on the
sources of opportunity costs in section 2). A historical example of this would be the revolutionary activities
launched by students and intellectuals against Tsar Alexander III of Russia during the period1881-94.41
This revolutionary movement was launched by small groups of students and intellectuals, and had high
opportunity costs (due to their lack of an organized political apparatus that could reach the masses). The
Tsar adopted a high level of enforcement and employed very repressive tactics against them. However, the
revolutionaries saw their actions as the only hope for galvanizing the Russian people, and were very active
against the Tsar. However, their movement did not gain enough mass participation. On the other hand,
it seems that the revolutionary leadership in Russia during the period 1905-17 comprised more of career
politicians, belonging to organized political parties having a nation-wide organizational apparatus. Further,
as these leaders had adopted politics as a career, they arguably had lower opportunity costs of leading
political (protest) movements. These leaders were able to lead more widespread movements against the
Tsar, taking advantage of their lower opportunity costs (perhaps because of their natural ability to lead
political protest), even without being as active as the revolutionaries of the earlier period.
3.2 E¤ect of occupiers attitude on the nature of protest
In this section I will analyze how the nature of the movement a¤ected by the intrinsic level of pacism of the
occupier. It is assumed that a more hawkish occupier punishes the protest leader more for the same level of
41Though this example is not exactly in the context of occupied regions, we see that some of the results of this paper may be
applied to more general settings as well. Further, it maybe argued that the tyrranical Tsarist Russia of the time displayed many
of the characteristics displayed by occupied territories in later historical period. Interestingly, this situation may be contrasted
with the one described in footnote 36. The similarities are striking - with the notable exception that the populace in feudal
Russia had strong loyalty towards the Tsar at the time. This may have led to the underlying di¤erences, which are captured
through the contrasting conditions of propostions 1 and 2 respectively.
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activity, compared to a more pacist occupier. Further, it is assumed that it is possible to deliver this higher
punishment with the given level of military or police, perhaps by instructing the existing force to act tougher.
This means that for any pair (a; c) the punishment P delivered by a more hawkish occupier is greater than
the punishment delivered by one more pacist. In reality, there might be a change in the government of the
occupying nation, which might bring about a change in attitude towards the protest movement.
Denition 2. (Hawkish occupier): A occupier i is dened to be morehawkishthan a occupier j if i > j.
Recall that  is the weighting parameter of the punishment function. Note that if i > j , for any pair
(a; c), P i = ip(a; c) > P j = jp(a; c).
A more hawkish occupier is simply one who has the proclivity to punish more. We observe from the
payo¤ function of the occupier, that inicting a higher punishment involves greater costs for the occupier,
as enforcement cost E = P . Thus, a more hawkish occupier, who punishes more, will have greater
punishment costs. This agrees with reality, where greater actions against insurgents may entail more military
casualties, greater international condemnation, and higher operational costs. Some critics might suggest that
enforcement costs are actually lower for a more hawkish occupier. We would argue against their reasoning,
as it seems straightforward that enforcement costs (of the kind just mentioned) are greater for absolutely
higher punishment.42
Lemma 3. @a

@ < 0 always.
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This implies that if punishment increases due to a rise in , ceteris paribus, the protest leader will curtail
activity. Also note that when the occupier becomes more hawkish, there are two e¤ects for the protest leader.
First, for any given combination (a; c), their punishment rises. Further, a more hawkish occupier might vary
the level of c as well, which would have a further e¤ect on punishment.44
The following propositions consider the e¤ect of a variation of  on the equilibrium level of activity and
mass participation. Equilibria where protest activity rises for a more hawkish occupier, are characterized.
As before, it is possible to analyze the nature of the population and the type of punishment that need to
exist, for these outcomes to occur.
Proposition 3: For a and c being strategic complements for her (i.e. @a

@c > 0), a protest leader will be more
active while confronting a more hawkish occupier if: (i). @
2a
@@c < 0; (ii). 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2  at c; and
(iii).
@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these conditions, the protest movement has greater mass-support when the
42 In reality, a more hawkish occupier might also have a chilling e¤ect on the population, as it would have a proclivity to
punish the populace more than a dovish occupier (for any given level of permissiveness). However, there is also argument to
the e¤ect that a hawkish occupier might have an incendiary e¤ect on the populace. As empirical literature has not addressed
this issue conclusively, I have avoided controversy by not making any further assumptions in this regard, and sticking to my
simple specication of the conversion function. In spite of this simplication, the results of this section provide some rather
useful insights of the conict process, involving hawkish vis-a-vis dovish controllers.
43As @a

@
=
pa
!faa  gaa paa ; the result follows from the assumptions regarding the partials.
44 In graphical terms, the iso-utility map of the occupier undergoes a change, and there is also a shift in the reaction function
of the protest leaders. The combination of these two factors produces a change in the equilibrium outcome.
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occupier is more hawkish.
Proof: See appendix 2. 
Note that a more hawkish occupier is more permissive in this particular case. The conditions of the propo-
sition identify the factors underlying this result:
(i). a and c are strategic complements, so a protest leader is able to raise her payo¤ by complementing an
increase in permissiveness with greater activity. As mentioned before, strategic complementarity arises if
the gain in conversion more than o¤sets the change in punishment, when both activity and permissiveness
increase. This could happen if population becomes su¢ ciently more responsive to their leaders activities or
propaganda in a more permissive environment.
(ii). The condition @
2a
@@c < 0 implies that in this case, when faced with a more hawkish occupier (a rise in
), the reaction function of the protest leader will be steeper. So, a hawkish occupier makes the latter less
willing to increase activity, for any given level of permissiveness.
(iii). We have 
 @2p@a2  >   @2f@a2 . Note that as  = , there is a greater chance of this inequality being
satised for a hawkish occupier, with higher . As per this inequality, the occupiers enforcement costs grow
at a substantial rate (greater than the growth of the conversion rate) for an increase in protest activity.
So, the occupier needs to nd a way to manage these costs. It does this by decreasing the level of policing
(more permissiveness). This, in the end, leads to more activity. So, the more hawkish occupier actually faces
greater activity, but cutting back on the level of policing saves greatly on enforcement costs. Note that if
this cutback does not occur, given its natural proclivity (or maybe in case of a government, its pre-committed
electoral manifesto), it will use the bigger police force or army to punish so much that there will be huge
enforcement costs.
(iv). The condition
@a@c dcd  > @a@  needs to hold. This is needed because a more hawkish occupier has
two e¤ects for the protest leader. First, there is a negative e¤ect on his activity. Second, his activity level is
also a¤ected by how this type of occupier varies c, compared to a more pacist one. In this case c increases,
and combined with the strategic complementarity of a and c, there is a positive e¤ect on activity level.
This positive e¤ect needs to outweigh the negative one, for the net amount of activity to increase. Further,
as per the proposition, not only is the protest leader more active, but the protest movement has greater
mass-support under these circumstances, as both permissiveness and activity level go up.
The above proposition has interesting real world implications. It seems that more pacist occupiers might
actually be able to maintain their military strength in occupied areas, and discourage protest activities.
However, the inherent lack of restraint of hawkish occupiers make the cost of maintaining military strength
too much for them, as due to their predisposition for harshness, they use their military to punish to an extent
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Figure 5: Case1: Shift in the iso-utility map for hawkish controller
that is very costly for them (perhaps in terms of heightened international scrutiny and sanctions).45 Hence,
in face of costly enforcement, they are forced to consider a cutback of their military from the occupied
area, which leads to greater activity by the protest leaders, and the growth of the protest movement.46
Diagrammatically representing the results from propositions 3 in gure 5, we see that a change in equilibrium
occurs when the controller becomes more hawkish. This is due to a shift in its iso-utility map of in the case
of a more hawkish controller, and the reaction function of the protest leadership becoming steeper.47 Due
to this shift the equilibrium point moves from S to S0.48 A historical incident corresponding to this outcome
may be seen in the climbdown of the hard-line Ariel Sharon government in 2004-05, in the Israeli-Palestinian
conict, and the pursuance of a unilateral disengagement policy by Israel.
Proposition 4: For a and c being strategic substitutes for her (i.e. @a

@c > 0), a protest leader will be
more active while confronting a more hawkish occupier if: (i). @
2a
@@c > 0; (ii).
 @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2  at c;
(iii).  < 1
[ @p@c ]
h
(fa + pa)
@2a
@@c +

@
@
h
 @f@a + 
@p
@a
i
@a
@c
i
; and (iv).
@a@c dcd  > @a@  : Under these
conditions, the protest movement has lesser mass-support when the occupier is more hawkish.
Proof: The proof of the rst part of the proposition is similar to the proof of proposition 3. In this case,
observe that for an increase in , the occupier maximizes its utility by decreasing c as its best response. To
prove the second part of the statement suppose that for a more pacist occupier (i.e. when  was lower), the
payo¤ level was 0, for strategy pair (a0; c0) and conversion level f0. Note that for an increase in , keeping c
45Note that we have assumed that a hawkish controller has to punish more than a dovish controller for any given military
level. In real life this might arise due political or ideological pre-commitments made by the hawkish controller, either to its
electorate or to political partners, in case of democratic governments (of the kind seen in Israel, for example).
46Though admittedly, such cutbacks by a pacist government would have caused an even greater escalation. However, due
to its restraint, a pacist government does not have to undertake such cutbacks.
47Note that in this case, a hawkish controller can maintain a given payo¤ level, for a given value of a, compared to a dovish
occupier, only through the combination of a higher c (compared to the dovish one). This causes a relative shift of the iso-utility
map of the hawkish controller along the lines seen in the diagram.
48The reader will recognize that a change in the punishment function, making the controller more severe, will a¤ect the
reaction function of the protest leaders. In both propostions 3 and 4, it will shift the reaction function to the left. In case of
propostion 3 here, the reaction function of the protest leader is steeper (less reactive), when the controller is more hawkish.
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xed at c0, a would decline (as @a

@ < 0): In that case, let the occupiers payo¤ be denoted by 
1, for strategy
pair (a1; c0). For 1 let enforcement costs be E1 and conversion level f1. Note that given the properties of
the conversion function, f1 < f0. However, the occupier chooses to decrease c, and not keep it xed at c0,
taking it to payo¤ level to  with strategy pair (a; c), with enforcement costs E and conversion level f.
Then it must be that  > 1. But as c < c0 and a > a1, it must be that E > E1 (from the properties
of the punishment function). In that case,  > 1, only if f < f1. Given f1 < f0, the properties of the
conversion function ensure that f < f0. Thus, the protest movement has lesser mass-support when the
occupier is more hawkish.
In this case, a more hawkish occupier is less permissive. The conditions of the proposition identify the factors
underlying this result:
(i). a and c are strategic substitutes, so less permissiveness by the occupier brings about greater activity
by the protest leader. If permissiveness declines, the only way the protest leader can maintain a level of
conversion (hence maintaining their payo¤ somewhat) is by increasing activity. This is possible because the
population is more receptive to the protest leader for a decline in permissiveness.
(ii). The condition @
2a
@@c > 0 implies that for a more hawkish occupier, the reaction function (@a
=@c)
is of the protest leader is atter. In this case, a hawkish occupier make the protest leader more willing to
take advantage of permissiveness - hence, as permissiveness can cause substantial losses for it, the occupier
is driven towards less permissiveness.
(iii). The condition
 @2f@a2  <   @2p@a2  must hold. As a and c are strategic substitutes, if the occupier
decreases c, the protest leader will increase a. This increase in a should not succeed in converting people
to the movement, beyond a certain level. Thus, in absolute terms their rate of conversion to the protest
movement due to an increase in a (or @
2f
@a2 ) should not be too high.
(iv). The cost of increasing policing (again, perhaps in terms of international boycotts, casualty rates
of soldiers, etc.) should not be too high. This is captured in the proposition by the fact that the scaling
parameter , which translates punishment levels into enforcement costs for the occupier, should be su¢ ciently
low. Only then will the more hawkish occupier be in a position to raise its enforcement level.49
(v). The condition
@a@c dcd  > @a@  should hold. As mentioned before, there is a negative e¤ect on the
activity of protest leader, for a more hawkish occupier, who punishes more (i.e.@a

@ < 0). However, in this
case, a more hawkish occupier decreases c. Combined with the strategic substitutability of a and c, there is
a positive e¤ect on activity level. This positive e¤ect needs to outweigh the negative one, for the net amount
of activity to increase.
49 Interestingly, the condition on parameter  does not appear in proposition 3, as there the controller becomes more permissive,
opposite to what we have here.
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Figure 6: Case 2: Shift in the iso-utility map for a hawkish controller
This proposition is represented diagrammatically in gure 6. It is interesting to compare the shift in the
iso-utility map of the controller in this case, to the case seen in proposition 3. Here, punishment costs are
not that signicantly high (even for a more hawkish controller). Thus, it is possible to make up for the
somewhat higher punishment costs (for given permissiveness levels) if the activity level of the protest leader
decreases signicantly. Hence, for given permissiveness levels, lower activity level combinations would give
a more hawkish controller the same successive payo¤ levels of a dovish controller. This causes the shift of
the iso-utility map for a more hawkish controller to be like the one observed in gure 6, in this case (rather
than the one observed in gure 5, earlier).
To summarize, the population becomes prone to conversion in this case, for a more hawkish controller.
The enforcement costs are low enough for the occupier (perhaps due to an international community that
is supportive of the controller, materially or politically) vis-a-vis the possible loss from conversion. In this
situation, a hawkish occupier might become less permissive, and increase the size of the occupational force.
Given this, the protest leaders have to raise their activities to win converts and preserve their movement to
whatever extent possible. With a more receptive population, it is possible for the protest leaders to keep the
movement alive by increasing their activity level, in the face of increased harshness. Overall, under these
circumstances, there will be a reduction in the populations participation in the protest movement.
It is observed in this section that a more hawkish occupier can lead to a more active protest leaders under
two circumstances. However, depending on population characteristics and punishment costs, these there are
di¤erent implications for the nature of protest, depending on the particular circumstance. Thus, it is essential
to closely analyze the population characteristics, punishment structure, and the details of enforcement costs,
in order to reach proper conclusions regarding the e¤ect of the occupiers pacist tendencies on the protest
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movement.50
4 Discussion and Policy Implications
In this section I will discuss two di¤erent aspects of my model and its results. In section 4.1, by placing
the results of my model in their proper context in the conict literature, I will attempt to discuss what my
results might imply in terms of a protest movement being violent or non-violent in nature. In section 4.2, I
will discuss policy implications of my model for third party intervention.
4.1 Implications for the choice of protest activity: violence or non-violence?
A summary of the results seen in the last section, omitting some of the pertinent details, gives us four
interesting scenarios that might occur in case of protests in occupied regions.51 Two of these are dependent
on the type of the protest leader, and two on the type of the occupier. We see that:
(a). Scenario 1 (from proposition 1): High opportunity cost protest leaders are more likely to be successful
compared to radical leaders in leading workable protest movements, though inherently they may use more
moderate forms of protest. The occupier would be lenient in dealing with the protest movement, in this
case, because of high punishment costs.
(b). Scenario 2 (from proposition 2): High opportunity cost protest leaders are less likely to be successful
compared to lower-cost leaders in leading workable protest movements, when there are low costs to the
occupier for harshly punishing these leaders. However, in order to lead a semblance of a movement, these
leaders will pursue strident activities.
(c). Scenario 3 (from proposition 3): If enforcement costs are high, the hawkish controllers predisposition
towards harshness makes the cost of maintaining high military strength too much for him (as he over-uses
any given level of military). Hence, he is forced to consider a cutback of their military from the occupied
area, which leads to greater activity by the protest leaders, and the growth of the protest movement.
(d). Scenario 4 (from proposition 4): The enforcement costs are low enough for the occupier. In this
situation, a hawkish occupier might become less permissive. In this case the protest leaders try to keep the
movement alive by increasing their activity level, in the face of increased harshness.
In my model, the protest leader acts to choose a level of activity, which a¤ects the conversion of the masses
to the protest movement. There is no direct implication regarding the nature of this activity - particularly
50 It would be interesting to study the Israeli-Palestine conict in the context of our analysis. Once the fundamentals of
the conict are identied (population characteristics, etc.), it might be possible to analyze how the nature of successive Israeli
governments (which varied in their attitudes) impacted the nature of the conict. As part of future work, the validity of this
papers ndings may be tested in that context.
51These scenarios are not exhaustive. An exhaustive list would have to contain all possible permutations of the respective
conditions seen in the propositions of section 3. As the reader understands, the outcomes detailed in the propositions are some
of the more interesting situations that might occur.
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whether the activity is violent or non-violent in nature. However, placing the results of my model in the
context of some other contributions within the conict literature, some of the other assumptions of my model,
and historical facts, we can arrive at some interesting conjectures. In scenarios 1 and 3 above, the occupier
allows the protest leaders some leeway in conducting the protest movement. In scenario 1, the result is
partially driven by the high opportunity cost of the protest leader (which might plausibly arise from moral
grounds against violence, as discussed in length in section 2 above). Further, in both scenarios 1 and 3, the
occupier has high punishment costs, perhaps arising out the high political and diplomatic costs of punishing
the protest leaders. In a recent work, Gangopadhyay (2009) shows the link between intolerance and violent
conict.52 Putting together these observations, it might be possible to conjecture that more toleranceby
the occupier (leading to greater scope of expression of the protest leaders), seen in scenarios 1 and 3, might
be conducive to more non-violent protest. My discussion of the historical contexts for scenarios 1 and 3 in
section 3 above, provides us with real world instances where we might observe these scenarios.
Scenarios 2 and 4 present a di¤erent picture. In these scenarios, the occupier is repressive (or intolerant,
using Gangopadhyays terminology) of the protest leaders (leading to the latters low scope of expression).
Further, in scenario 2, the result is partially driven by high opportunity cost of the protest leader - which
might plausibly arise from his low prole and lack of political networks. Thus, the protest leader might need
a high prole eventto carry his message to the masses. Further, in both scenarios 2 and 4, the occupier
has low punishment costs, so there are low political costs of punishing the protest leaders. The conjunction
of all these facts might give us the perfect recipe for strident, high-impact, violent activities (as predicted
by Gangopadhyay in an atmosphere of su¢ cient intolerance).53 As before, my discussion of the historical
contexts for scenarios 2 and 4 in section 3 above, provides us with real world instances.
4.2 Policy implications for third party intervention
The role of international third-party interventions in mitigating conict has been the subject of previous re-
search. Particular note might be made of Siqueira (2003), where it was demonstrated that the interventionist
third party must not only take into account the direct impact of its e¤orts, but also the indirect impacts that
result from the strategic interaction among the parties involved.54 In the spirit of Siqueiras more general
52Gangopadhyays model presented in this article posits violent conict as a form of intolerance by one social group toward
another. Intolerance by one group begets intolerance by the other, and beyond a point, violent conict perpetuates itself. It is
interesting to see in Gangopadhyays paper that for such an occurrence, potential marginal penalties should not be too high.
This condition is analogous to those seen in my model, pertaining to opportunity costsof the protest leader and punishment
cost of the occupier.
53The ndings of research by Kirk (1983) and Frey and Luechinger (2003), when interpreted in the context of my paper, also
seem to imply that when governments turn repressive and close down options for broader avenues of protest, disadvantaged
protesters (or protest leaders, in our case) might turn to sporadic, attention-catching, violent actions (like high prole terrorist-
attacks) to spread their insurgent message.
54The reader might notice some of the technical similarities between Siqueira (2003) and my paper. It is possible that some
of the results observed in that paper might be suitably modied to address the obvious policy scenarios suggested by the results
of my model. That task is left to future research.
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ndings, Chang and Sanders (2009) explored conditions where third-party intervention promotes peace by
diminishing the strength of rebel groups. As might be guessed, my results suggest an alternate policy option
to interventionist third-parties, given the particular context under consideration.
My results suggest that interventionist third parties may have two routes of intervention in occupied regions.
The rst would be associated with manipulating the punishment costsof the occupier. The second would
be associated with manipulating the opportunity costsof the protest leaders. As observed in section 4.1,
more repression and violent conict might be associated with low punishment costs for the occupier. The
international community might take suitable direct and indirect measures (political, diplomatic, and ma-
terial) to keep punishment costs suitably high for the occupier, particularly in the case where the protest
leaders are moderate. On the other hand, two of the scenarios displaying repression and violent conict,
discussed in section 4.1, involve high opportunity costs for the protest leaders. In these particular situa-
tions, such opportunity costs are likely to arise from the leaderslow prole and lack of political networks
(some historical examples of these situations were discussed in section 3). An interventionist third party,
wanting to di¤use the situation, might help the protest leaders overcome these particular opportunity costs
by providing them with a suitable international political platform or venue to articulate their message, and
also raise their visibility and stature in the process.
As the reader will understand, the third-party intervention polices mentioned above are speculative in nature
at this point, though their logic seems valid, based on my theoretical results. Policymaking in the context
of conict in occupied regions is tricky, and must take into account the nuances of the particular situation.
Workable and specic policy prescriptions would require further research, which might perhaps require
interdisciplinary collaboration. Policy suggestions must also be founded on the empirical validity of the
theoretical results presented in this paper. Such validation presents considerable challenge, and lies in the
arena of future research.
5 Concluding Remarks
A simple model has been developed in this paper to examine two important questions related to the
nature of protest (or independence) movements in regions under occupation (or disputed regions). First,
how is the nature of a protest movement a¤ected by the opportunity costs of the leaders who lead these
movements? Second, how is the nature of the movement a¤ected by the intrinsic level of hawkishness of the
occupiers? These questions are motivated by facts observed in historical liberation struggles (e.g. the Indian
Independence Movement) and present day conicts (e.g. the Israeli-Palestinian conict). The answers to
these questions, as identied by this paper, are relevant to truly understanding the nature of such conicts,
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and will assist in their successful management. I have discussed the results of the paper in detail in section
4 above, as well as their policy implications.
Further, a major contribution of this paper lies in identifying and characterizing the priors which lead to
the outcomes of protest movements in occupied regions. These priors involve the characteristics of the
population residing in the occupied region, the nature of punishment that is being meted out to the leaders
of the protest movement, and enforcement costs. Di¤erences in these priors lead to the nature of various
protest movements being di¤erent in some crucial aspects, though they might be similar in other aspects.
No doubt, a comprehensive characterization of these priors is essential in developing tailor-made conict
management strategies in the context of a particular protest or liberation movement.55
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of proposition 1
Proof: From the FOC of the occupier :
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d jc=c =  
@F=@ 
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Now, the denominator is always negative for the payo¤ function of the occupier being concave at c.
So, if @F=@ jc=c > 0, then dcd jc=c > 0:
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But @F=@ jc=c > 0, only if
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Now, fa and pa are positive (from the assumptions on fa and pa) .
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As per Lemma 1, @a
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 at c = c(recalling that faa < 0 and paa > 0)]
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As @a

@ < 0, it follows that for
@a
@c jc=c
> 0 and dc

d > 0; we have
da
d > 0 if
@a@c dcd  > @a@  at c = c:
The rst part of proposition 1 follows from the above conditions.
Now, as dc

d > 0 and
da
d > 0, we have
df
d > 0, given fa > 0 and fc > 0 (per assumption):
Hence under the conditions of the proposition the protest movement has greater mass support for a higher-
cost leadership 
Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 3
Proof: Applying the implicit function theorem to the FOC of the occupier:
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The denominator is always negative for the payo¤ function of the occupier being concave at c.
So, if @F=@jc=c > 0, then dcd jc=c > 0:
But, @F=@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Now, fa and pa are positive, and pc is negative.
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@ < 0, it follows that for
@a
@c jc=c
> 0 ; and dcd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da
d > 0 if
@a@c dcd  > @a@  at c = c:
The rst part of proposition 3 follows from the above conditions.
To prove the second part of the proposition, observe that as dc

d > 0 and
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 > 0, we have
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 > 0; given
fa > 0 and fc > 0 (per assumption):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